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Tax Discourse and the Impasse of Justice: A Tunisian Citizen's Reading of a State That Demands Without Accountability
When Tunisia's Minister of Finance stood before Parliament to announce that tax revenues represented ninety-one point four percent of the state's total revenues, and then called on those she described as holders of hidden funds to come forward and pay their dues to the Treasury, this was not a mere statistical statement. For the Tunisian citizen whose salary is deducted every month before he even sees its color, and who watches prices devour what remains of it, this discourse carried a heavy irony. The state that possesses the police, customs, oversight bodies, and the tax administration comes out to ask tax evaders to volunteer themselves, while it has neither the capacity nor the will to pursue them and subject them to the law. This is not so much a fiscal discourse as an implicit admission of the limits of sovereignty, and of the fact that the state, supposedly tasked with ensuring justice among citizens in rights and duties, seems content with words in the face of a parallel economy that swells year after year.
The truth that the ordinary citizen knows, without even reading economic reports, is that the informal economy is not a minor wound in the Tunisian economic body. Official figures speak of nearly thirty-nine percent of gross domestic product escaping state control. The mass of currency circulating outside banks has jumped to nearly thirty billion dinars, an increase of about twenty-four percent in a single year. These funds are not necessarily the money of innocent depositors afraid for their savings; they are largely made up of money from unstructured trade, organized tax evasion, and economic activity whose actors know perfectly well how to stay out of the spotlight. And the citizen who pays his tax on his declared salary, who sees his neighbor the merchant or self-employed professional buying in cash and living at a higher level than his own without paying what he pays, feels that the tax system is not a system of justice but a system of punishment for those who have no trick up their sleeve.
And the problem does not stop at the feeling of injustice. The problem is that the state, instead of using its legal, security, and oversight instruments to pursue these people, seems to choose the easiest path: a discourse asking people to come forward on their own. But why would an evader come forward? What sensible person would bring out his hidden funds to pay a tax he could have avoided, unless he suddenly decided to show civic virtue? A state that does not pursue the evader cannot ask him to volunteer. And when it does, it either admits its impotence or sends a dangerous message to the law-abiding citizen: you alone pay, because you have no other choice. The result is the collapse of trust, not only between the citizen and the government, but between the citizen and the entire tax system. For if the law applies to those who have neither power nor support, and those with influence are asked to kindly pay what they owe, then the state has lost the most elementary foundations of its financial legitimacy.
Then comes the greatest paradox: at a time when the state says it cannot find money, at a time when the citizen complains of the high cost of living and the erosion of purchasing power, new structures appear that consume public money which could have gone to services, investment, or even easing the tax burden. The National Council of Regions and Districts, the upper chamber created under the 2022 Constitution, has become the daily example of what the ordinary citizen calls "the institutional scarecrow." Its budget alone is estimated at about twenty-four million dinars within the state budget for 2026. This amount, in itself, is not catastrophic compared to the size of the state budget, but the problem is not in the figure as much as in the meaning. Over an entire year, this Council was able to use its intervention credits only to the tune of forty-two thousand dinars, directed as a bonus for its agents, while it remained incapable of creating a cooperative for its agents or joining international parliaments. Then came the motion of no confidence against its president, filed by twenty-eight deputies out of seventy-seven, describing the situation as "paralysis," "the grip of a shadow power," and "the transformation of the second legislative chamber into a phantom structure." Deputy Ali Hassoumi stated frankly that the Council had been "closed in on itself" for a year and a half, and that proposals from citizens and civil society reached neither the deputies nor were they debated. This is not merely an internal dispute among parliamentarians. It is proof that the citizen is called upon to finance a structure from which he sees no benefit, while being called upon at the same time to pay taxes to finance this structure and others.
And the Tunisian citizen, seeing this scene, does not need much analysis to connect the dots. The state that says it cannot find money to provide services finds money to finance a Council that produces nothing. The state that says it wants to fight tax evasion lets the informal economy grow until it becomes part of daily life. The state that asks the citizen to trust it shows him every day that it does not hold those who possess accountable, and does not protect those who do not possess. And here the question the citizen poses becomes entirely legitimate: if the state is incapable of imposing the law on evaders, incapable of providing services worthy of what he pays, and incapable of holding its institutions accountable when they consume without return, why would he believe it will not reach into his pocket at any moment?
And here emerges the fear that the Tunisian citizen cannot set aside, however much some try to soften it: the Lebanese experience. The day the Lebanese banks collapsed, the law did not protect depositors. People found no one to complain to, because the state itself was part of the collapse. And the Tunisian government says today that it has not imposed a twelve percent deduction on savings accounts, and that the finance bill does not include it. This may be true textually. But fear is not built on texts alone; it is built on behavior. When the citizen sees that the state is asking holders of hidden funds to declare them, when he sees that the Minister of Finance speaks of mobilizing national resources and integrating undeclared funds, the first thing that comes to his mind is not that the state will pursue smugglers, but that the state might find in his modest savings an easier target. This fear may be exaggerated legally, but it is not exaggerated politically. For trust is not built by an official denial, but by concrete acts. And the state has not yet shown that it is capable or willing to hold the big players accountable, while it has given the impression of looking for money where pressure is easy.
The essence of the crisis is not in taxation as a tool, nor in the need to finance the budget, for every state needs resources. The essence is that the citizen no longer sees in the state a fair partner. A state that demands duty from all, but does not guarantee that all will fulfill duty, becomes a state that imposes tax only on the law-abiding. And a state that creates new councils and structures while saying it cannot find money becomes a state that spends without priority. And a state that asks the citizen to trust it, while leaving him alone in the face of the high cost of living, price inflation, and weak services, becomes a state that has lost the most elementary tools of its legitimacy: the feeling that it stands on the side of those who pay, not those who evade.
What the Minister of Finance said was not a mere passing statement. It was a moment of unveiling. A moment in which the citizen realized that the state knows where the problem lies, but deals with it with the logic of request rather than imposition. And when the state becomes a petitioner rather than an actor, when tax becomes a burden on those who cannot evade, when new institutions become an additional burden on a budget paid by the civil servant, the small merchant, and the law-abiding professional, then the natural result is not only anger, but the withdrawal of trust. And when trust withdraws, no discourse can restore it, whatever the declared intentions, and whatever the legal texts written. For the citizen does not read texts; he reads his daily life. And his daily life tells him that the state which does not hold the evader accountable, which spends on a Council that does not function, and which asks him to pay more, is not the state he was promised.
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