The Struggle for Israel's Premiership in October 2026: A Reading of Polls and Post-Election Alliances (article)

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The Struggle for Israel's Premiership in October 2026: A Reading of Polls and Post-Election Alliances

The Israeli political scene is currently experiencing one of the most contentious periods in years. With the parliamentary elections scheduled for October 27 fast approaching, a fierce competition is unfolding between incumbent Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Chief of Staff Gadi Eizenkot. Yet this rivalry transcends mere personal political confrontation; it reflects deep transformations in the partisan structure and political alliances that could reshape Israel's contours for years to come. What makes these elections different from their predecessors is that the polls do not offer a definitive answer regarding the identity of the next Prime Minister. Rather, they outline multiple scenarios, reflecting a partisan paralysis that could extend for months after the official results are announced.

Polls published by the Israeli Public Broadcasting Corporation and other media outlets paint a complex picture, marked by an extremely tight race between the two main political poles. A Channel 12 poll conducted on August 20 gives the "Yachar" party, led by Gadi Eizenkot, twenty-four seats if elections were held today, compared to twenty-one for Netanyahu's "Likud." Yet the most striking indicator is the "suitability for the premiership" metric: according to a Public Broadcasting Corporation poll, forty-four percent of voters prefer Eizenkot, compared to only thirty-four percent for Netanyahu, while sixteen percent remain undecided. This gap in perceived suitability reflects a significant shift in voter preferences, especially given that Netanyahu has long relied on his image as an indispensable security leader in confronting the existential challenges facing the Hebrew state.

Another poll, published by Maariv, reveals an even wider gap between the two parties, with twenty-six seats for "Yachar" against twenty for "Likud," while the "Yahad" alliance led by Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid would secure fourteen seats. This seat gap means that the anti-Netanyahu opposition camp would command a clear majority of sixty seats against forty-nine for the outgoing coalition. Yet these figures, as significant as they are, do not tell the whole story. The Israeli partisan landscape suffers from extreme fragmentation, making the transformation of these numbers into a stable government exceedingly difficult. The numerous small parties that share the goal of ousting Netanyahu diverge radically on national security, the management of the Gaza file, relations with Palestinians, and the shape of the future government, preventing the formation of a coherent bloc capable of governing effectively.

The crux of the current political crisis lies in the inability of either camp to secure the absolute majority of sixty-one seats. According to the Public Broadcasting Corporation poll, Netanyahu's camp would win forty-nine seats if the new party of General Ofer Winter enters the electoral race – a scenario that effectively weakens the far-right bloc traditionally aligned with Netanyahu. In contrast, the change camp, led by Eizenkot, would secure sixty seats, needing only one additional seat to reach the majority required to form a coalition. Arab parties, meanwhile, would together hold eleven seats according to the same poll. But translating this number into effective support for an Eizenkot government remains fraught with political and ideological pitfalls, particularly given the refusal of a large segment of the Jewish electorate to rely on Arab parties in forming a government.

This complex equation has placed Eizenkot and his team before difficult choices. In recent weeks, "Yachar" has begun preparing a fallback scenario: the formation of a minority government, relying on only fifty-eight or fifty-nine seats. This scenario is permitted under Israeli law, which does not require the government to secure the approval of sixty-one Knesset members, but only a simple majority of those present at the voting session. This scenario reflects Eizenkot's deep recognition that partisan paralysis is likely to persist even after the elections, and that the most realistic path to unseat Netanyahu may not be through securing an absolute majority, but through exploiting loopholes in the parliamentary system that allow a government to be formed with less than the numerical majority. Interestingly, Eizenkot's associates are posing a fundamental question to public opinion: is a minority government supported by fifty-eight MKs, representing approximately forty-nine percent of voters, less legitimate than keeping Netanyahu in his post as interim Prime Minister, backed by a bloc of no more than fifty seats representing forty-one percent of voters? This question reflects a shift in Israeli political discourse, where the debate is no longer solely about who holds a majority, but also about the legitimacy of governance in the absence of a clear majority.

The roots of this crisis extend back to the 2019-2021 period, which witnessed four successive general elections, each ending in deadlock and the inability to form a stable government. Throughout this period, Netanyahu remained Prime Minister in an interim capacity, not because he enjoyed a parliamentary majority, but simply because he already occupied the office. This situation persisted until mid-2021, when a heterogeneous coalition briefly succeeded in removing him. The change camp now fears a repetition of this scenario, where Netanyahu might once again remain in place while attempts to form an alternative government falter. It is here that the minority government option takes on its full significance. Even if such a government does not survive long, even if its failure leads to the dissolution of the Knesset and new elections, it would fundamentally alter the political equation, as it would make Eizenkot the interim Prime Minister during the transition period, depriving Netanyahu of the incumbency advantage he has long relied upon.

The alternative path to forming a government lies in including the Arab party "Raam," led by Mansour Abbas, in the coalition. This option would add four or five decisive seats, allowing Eizenkot to easily cross the majority threshold. Yet it faces fierce opposition among the Jewish electorate: fifty-five percent of Netanyahu-camp voters strongly reject this possibility. Even within the change camp, this choice is far from consensual. Naftali Bennett has declared that he would not renew the alliance with Raam in case of victory, a clear sign of the shifting political mood after the October 7 events, which have made any open cooperation with Arab parties more sensitive than it was in 2021. The root of this sensitivity lies in Raam's identity as a southern offshoot of the Islamic Movement in Israel. Despite Abbas's persistent efforts to distance the party from the movement's religious-spiritual leadership, a large segment of the Jewish public continues to view political partnership with it as a red line not to be crossed. This situation places Eizenkot before a delicate equation: either opt for a minority government, less stable but more acceptable to his electoral base, or risk losing his voters' support by engaging in open cooperation with Arab parties.

On its side, the "Yahad" alliance, bringing together Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid, represents another attempt to unify opposition ranks. Yet this alliance itself reveals fundamental disagreements between its leaders. Bennett advocates an offensive doctrine, based on changing the deterrence equation vis-à-vis Iran and Hezbollah: any Hezbollah attack should trigger a direct retaliation against Iran. He also calls for rethinking Israel's policy toward Gaza, excluding Turkey and Qatar from post-war arrangements in favor of Egypt, while preserving Israel's freedom of military action in the Strip. Lapid, in contrast, appears more cautious toward Turkey, advocating de-escalation rather than confrontation, believing that continued friction is not in Israel's interest. These differences between two partners in the same alliance reflect the heterogeneity of the change camp, and raise questions about its ability to offer a unified and coherent vision of governance should it succeed in unseating Netanyahu. These questions grow sharper as polls show Eizenkot advancing, heightening his rivals' fears that he may become the dominant force within the opposition, which faces a dual challenge: overthrowing Netanyahu on one hand, and preventing internal leadership struggles and disagreements over the shape of government from dissipating its electoral strength on the other.

Compounding the complexity is the ongoing dynamism of partisan alliances. A recent Public Broadcasting Corporation poll shows that the merger of the "Front" and "National Democratic Assembly" parties within the Joint Arab List increased the Arab parties' seats by one, with the Joint List winning seven seats against five for Raam. Meanwhile, "Yachar" remains the largest party with twenty-four seats, while Likud slips to twenty-three. These minute variations in seat distribution could prove decisive in the government formation equation, especially as the election date nears, allowing small parties to adjust their strategies. Another poll indicates that Eizenkot's bloc – including Bennett, Lapid, Lieberman, and the Democrats – would command approximately fifty-eight or fifty-nine seats, figures that approach the majority but fall short. This closeness makes every additional seat precious, and explains the intense pressure exerted by different parties on their voters to capture the extra votes that could tip the entire balance.

It is important to note that these polls reflect voting intentions at a specific moment, and may shift significantly as the elections approach, especially given that the far-right parties that formed part of Netanyahu's coalition face an existential threat from the entry of new parties into the arena. For instance, the "Religious Zionism" party, which held four seats, could lose all parliamentary representation should General Winter's party enter the race, redistributing seats in a way that weakens the far-right bloc and strengthens the opposition's position. This dynamic recalls how small parties can influence power balances in parliamentary systems, and how minimal shifts in vote distribution can produce significant differences in final outcomes. This is precisely what makes forecasting the current election results more difficult than usual.

Reading the landscape through these polls and analyses suggests that the next Israeli Prime Minister will most likely be Gadi Eizenkot. But this outcome is not yet assured. The paths leading to this post are multiple and complex, and will likely demand intensive efforts to form post-election alliances. The gap between Eizenkot and Netanyahu in seats and in the suitability index gives the former chief of staff an advantage, but Israeli political history is replete with last-minute surprises and unexpected reversals. The most pressing question, therefore, is not simply who will win the elections, but rather whether Israel will enter a new governance crisis similar to that of 2019-2021, or whether one of the camps will finally manage to break the deadlock and form a stable government. Complicating matters further, the options available to Eizenkot – whether minority government or reliance on Arab parties – carry political risks that could undermine any government formed. This means the Israeli political landscape may remain in a state of suspense and flux well after the official results are announced. Ultimately, the real stakes of these elections lie not only in the identity of the Prime Minister, but in the future of the Israeli political system itself and its capacity to emerge from the impasse in which it has been mired for years.

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